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I. INTRODUCTION
Joe Peterson, a friend of a friend, comes into your office one
sunny afternoon to ask for your help in filing a lawsuit against his
doctor for the problems arising out of his back surgery last fall. As
Mr. Peterson tells his story, you begin to think that he might have a
decent case.
Mr. Peterson suffered from chronic back pain for years before his
surgery. Although Mr. Peterson's pain often made it difficult for him
to work, his employers did not offer health benefits that would cover
the necessary surgery. That changed last spring, when Mr. Peterson
began working for ABC Corporation. ABC offered a comprehensive
benefits package, including health insurance that covered Mr.
Peterson's back surgery. The company that provided ABC's health
plan, Consolidated Health Care, is a managed care organization
(MCO) that provides healthcare directly to patients through its
employee physicians and medical facilities. Mr. Peterson scheduled his
surgery with Dr. Jones, one of Consolidated's employee physicians.
After undergoing surgery, Mr. Peterson found that his back pain
drastically increased. Eventually, he found that he could work only for
short periods of time. The pain forced Mr. Peterson to quit his job at
ABC and he applied for and received disability benefits. He has not
worked for six months.
* J.D. 1999, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., Northeast Louisiana University. Once
again, thank you Kim.
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After reviewing Mr. Peterson's medical records, you agree to
accept his case. You file a medical malpractice action in county court,
alleging that Dr. Jones failed to meet the standard of care in negligent-
ly performing Mr. Peterson's back surgery. You also name Consoli-
dated Health Care as a codefendant, alleging that Dr. Jones was
Consolidated's agent and that Consolidated is vicariously liable for Dr.
Jones' negligence.
Shortly after filing the action against Dr. Jones and Consolidated,
you receive in the mail a copy of Consolidated's notice removing Mr.
Peterson's case to federal court. When you speak to Consolidated's
counsel on the phone later that day, she informs you that Consolidated
provided ABC's health coverage under an ERISAl-governed employee
benefit plan. Under ERISA, she says, Consolidated can remove Mr.
Peterson's claim to federal court and try the case before a federal judge,
rather than a state court jury. What's more, she tells you, ERISA not
only provides for federal court jurisdiction, but also preempts any
claims that relate to an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. You
see what she's driving at even before she brings her point home:
because Consolidated provides ABC's health coverage under an
ERISA-governed employee benefit plan, Joe's claim against Consoli-
dated relates to that benefit plan; therefore, ERISA preempts Joe's
claim.
You hang up the telephone in a daze. You counted on a state
court medical malpractice trial before a state court jury. You've never
even been in the federal courthouse, much less argued before a federal
judge. You look out the window into a gray day and wonder how you
got yourself into this. More to the point, you wonder how you will get
yourself, and your client, out.
This Comment addresses the dilemma in which practitioners, such
as the one above, find themselves when faced with an ERISA
preemption defense to a claim they thought was run-of-the-mill
medical malpractice. As little as two years ago Consolidated's counsel
may have been at least partly correct in arguing that ERISA preempted
Mr. Peterson's claim. However, the Supreme Court decided a pair of
ERISA preemption cases during its 1997 term2 that may limit an
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
2. Besides the two discussed in Section II.B below, the Supreme Court decided a third
ERISA preemption case during the 1997 term. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
However, the Boggs Court relied on traditional principles of preemption rather than ERISA-
specific preemption in finding that ERISA preempted the Louisiana community property law at
issue. Id. at 841. Therefore, because the Boggs Court did not interpret ERISA's preemption
provisions in its decision, this Comment does not rely on it for authority.
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ERISA preemption defense by an MCO. Under those decisions,
medical malpractice claims alleging vicarious liability of MCOs for the
negligence of an affiliated physician should no longer insulate MCOs
from tort liability.
Section II of this Comment begins by briefly discussing the theory
of respondeat superior and the vicarious liability of MCOs for the
negligence of affiliated physicians.' Next, the section presents an
overview of ERISA, focusing on ERISA's preemption of laws that
impact employee benefit plans, particularly medical malpractice claims
brought against MCOs seeking to hold them vicariously liable for an
affiliated physician's negligence. Section III applies current ERISA
preemption doctrine to a situation such as Peterson's, in which a
plaintiff attempts to hold an MCO vicariously liable for an affiliated
physician's negligence. Section IV concludes that, given the current
state of ERISA preemption doctrine, MCOs should no longer be able
to raise a successful ERISA preemption defense to a straightforward
medical malpractice claim based on the MCO's vicarious liability for
affiliated physician malpractice.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Vicarious Liability of Managed Care Organizations
Although plaintiffs may attempt to hold MCOs liable for their
healthcare-related injuries under numerous theories,4 those who wish
to hold an MCO liable for an affiliated physician's negligence generally
proceed under one of two theories: respondeat superior or appar-
ent/ostensible agency.' The employment relationship between the
MCO and the affiliated physician dictates which theory the plaintiff
chooses.
1. Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer will face
liability for the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of
3. By "affiliated physician," this Comment refers to physicians either (1) employed directly
by an MCO, or (2) affiliated with an MCO as an independent contractor.
4. Plaintiffs may also attempt to hold MCOs vicariously liable under the nondelegable duty
doctrine or directly liable under theories of corporate negligence or negligent implementation of
cost containment systems. See 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047 (1995). These
theories are beyond the scope of this Comment, as it focuses solely on the vicarious liability of
MCOs for affiliated physician negligence.
5. See Zamora, supra note 4, at 1049-53. See also CHRISTOPHER KERNS ET AL.,
HEALTHCARE LIABILITY DESKBOOK 496-502 (1997) [hereinafter DESKBOOK].
1999] 1167
Seattle University Law Review
his or her employment.6 A plaintiff may prevail on a respondeat
superior theory alleging that an MCO is vicariously liable for an
affiliated physician's negligence in two situations.7
First, a plaintiff may attempt to hold an MCO vicariously liable
for an affiliated physician's negligence under a respondeat superior
theory where the MCO directly employs the physician.' Where the
MCO directly employs the physician, the physician becomes part of
the MCO's staff and a traditional employer-employee relationship
exists.9  Because an employer-employee relationship exists, the
respondeat superior theory readily applies.
Second, a plaintiff may attempt to hold an MCO vicariously liable
for an affiliated physician's negligence under a respondeat superior
theory even if the MCO does not directly employ the physician.1"
To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must prove that the MCO
occupied a position that allowed it to exercise control over the affiliated
physician." The more control that the MCO exercised over the
affiliated physician, the more likely that the MCO will face liability
under the respondeat superior theory. 2
2. Apparent/Ostensible Agency
Even if the plaintiff cannot establish an employment relationship
between the defendant MCO and the affiliated physician, he or she
may still attempt to hold the MCO liable under an apparent, or
ostensible, agency theory. Under such a theory, an MCO will face
liability for the negligence of a nonemployee affiliated physician if:
"(1) the MCO creates the appearance that the physician is in its
employ or that it is actually providing healthcare services (as opposed
to merely facilitating the provision of such services by others); and (2)
a patient reasonably and detrimentally relies on that appearance. 13
6. See L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There from Here - Questioning the Erosion of
ERISA Preemption in Medical Malpractice Actions Against HMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023, 1030
(1996).
7. See Zamora, supra note 4, at 1049-50; see also Coan, supra note 6, at 1030-33.
8. Those MCOs that directly employ physicians are typically referred to as "staff model"
MCOs. See Coan, supra note 6, at 1028.
9. See id.
10. Those MCOs that do not directly employ physicians are typically referred to as "group
model" MCOs or "IPA (individual practice association) model" MCOs. In both group model
and IPA model MCOs, the affiliated physician provides medical services to the MCO on a
contract basis. See Coan, supra note 6, at 1028-29.
11. See Zamora, supra note 4, at 1050.
12. See Coan, supra note 6, at 1032.
13. DESKBOOK, supra note 5, at 498.
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Stated another way, a court will generally find that apparent or
ostensible agency exists when (1) an MCO holds out the affiliated
physician as its employee, and (2) a patient looks to the MCO, rather
than the individual physician, for medical care. 4
B. ERISA Preemption
1. ERISA Preemption Generally
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to establish uniform federal
regulation of private employee benefit plans, including both pension
and employee welfare plans.15 ERISA defines "employee welfare
plan" as "any 'plan, fund, or program' maintained for the purpose of
providing medical or other health benefits for employees or their
beneficiaries 'through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.""' 6
Congress took several steps to ensure exclusive federal regulation
of benefit plans. First, Congress included in the text of ERISA two
preemption provisions that apply when state law claims impact an
ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. One of the preemption
provisions, which operates through the complete preemption doctrine,
is in reality a provision for exclusive federal court jurisdiction over
ERISA claims rather than a true "preemption" doctrine. 17 The other
preemption provision, often referred to as "the defense of 'conflict
preemption, ' '18 preempts state law that "relate[s] to any employee
benefit plan" governed by ERISA. 9 Second, in its attempt to ensure
exclusive federal regulation of benefit plans, Congress limited the
remedies available to plaintiffs bringing claims for ERISA violations.
The limited remedies appear in ERISA's civil enforcement provision,
which provides solely equitable, rather than legal, remedies. 20
a. Complete Preemption
To understand the doctrine of complete preemption, one must
first understand the rudiments of federal question jurisdiction, the
14. See Coan, supra note 6, at 1033.
15. See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127
(1992).
16. Id. (quoting ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
17. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (7th Cir. 1996).
18. Id. at 1486.
19. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
20. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). The civil enforcement provisions allow an ERISA
beneficiary to bring a claim "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan .. " ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
1999] 1169
Seattle University Law Review
well-pleaded complaint rule, and the removal of a federal case or claim
from state to federal court. 21
Federal question jurisdiction exists when a case arises "under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. ' 22 To determine
whether federal question jurisdiction exists, the well-pleaded complaint
rule requires a court to examine the facts pleaded in the plaintiffs
complaint.23 If the facts pleaded in the complaint raise issues of
federal law, then federal question jurisdiction exists.24 In such an
instance, a defendant may transfer the case from state court to federal
court by filing a removal petition.25  Although a defendant may
remove a federal claim from state to federal court, it may do so only
when the issue of federal law appears on the face of the plaintiffs
complaint. 26 The defendant may not create an issue of federal law by
raising a federal defense to the plaintiffs state-law claim. 27  Thus,
"[t]he issues raised in the plaintiff's complaint, not those added in the
defendant's response, control the litigation."2
The doctrine of complete preemption operates as an exception to
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 9 While labeled a doctrine of
preemption, "the complete preemption doctrine is not a preemption
doctrine but rather a federal jurisdiction doctrine."3  The doctrine
applies where a legislative act of Congress completely preempts a
particular area of state law,3 thus recharacterizing the claim as one
arising under federal law.32 Under the doctrine, even if the plaintiffs
complaint does not raise a federal claim, "federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists if the complaint concerns an area of law completely
preempted by federal law."33  Thus, the complete preemption
doctrine recharacterizes a state law claim as a claim arising under
21. While each of these doctrines represent discrete areas of law themselves, this Comment
addresses only those aspects of each doctrine necessary to a basic understanding of its subject.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
23. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1486.
24. See id.
25. See id. The statutory authority granting federal court removal jurisdiction appears in
28 U.S.C. § 1441: "[Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to
the district court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
26. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1995).
27. See id.
28. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1486.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 1487 (quoting Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 943 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989)).
31. See id. (quoting Lister, 890 F.2d at 943).
32. See id. at 1487.
33. Id.
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federal law. Once the complete preemption doctrine recharacterizes the
claim, the well-pleaded complaint rule no longer applies and a
defendant may both remove the case to federal court and raise a federal
law defense. 4
The complete preemption doctrine applies to state law claims that
fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions." To
determine whether a state law claim falls within the scope of the civil
enforcement provisions, a court must examine the terms of the ERISA-
governed benefit plan contract 36 to determine whether the plaintiff
attempts "to recover benefits due.., under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify ... rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."' 37
If the court cannot resolve the state law claim without interpreting the
terms of the benefit plan contract, then the plaintiff may seek only the
remedies available under the civil enforcement provision and the
complete preemption doctrine applies. 31 However, if the court can
resolve the state law claim without looking to the terms of the benefit
plan contract, then the plaintiff may seek remedies beyond those
prescribed under the civil enforcement provision and the complete
preemption doctrine does not apply.39
Where the complete preemption doctrine does not apply, the
plaintiffs state law claim is not recharacterized as one arising under
federal law, and thus cannot be removed to federal court.4" Although
the defendant in such a case may not invoke the complete preemption
doctrine, he or she may still invoke the doctrine of conflict preemption
in state court as a defense to the plaintiffs state law claim.4
b. Conflict Preemption
Whether they know it or not, most people who speak about
ERISA preemption generally speak about ERISA conflict preemption.
ERISA's conflict preemption provision, appearing in Section 514(a),
states that, with certain exceptions, ERISA "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" regulated by ERISA.42 As the ERISA cases
34. See Rice, 65 F.3d at 640.
35. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 354 (3rd Cir. 1995).
36. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1487.
37. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356 (quoting ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
38. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1487.
39. See Rice, 65 F.3d at 646.
40. See id.
41. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1487-88.
42. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
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illustrate, the Supreme Court has expended great energy in attempting
to clarify the "relates to" language of Section 514(a). The meaning of"relates to" aside, ERISA defines state laws as "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." 43
Thus, under Section 514(a), ERISA preempts both state statutory and
common law. However, Section 514(a) applies neither to state laws
regulating insurance, banking, or securities nor to generally applicable
state criminal laws."
The Supreme Court first attempted to construe Section 514(a) of
ERISA almost twenty years ago in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc.4" In Alessi, the Court examined a New Jersey statute that
prohibited an employer from offsetting employees' retirement benefits
by an amount equal to any workers' compensation award for which the
employee qualified.46 In holding that ERISA preempted the New
Jersey statute, the Court stated that the statute applied directly to a
method of calculating benefits under an ERISA-governed pension plan
and, thus, unquestionably "related to" that plan.47 However, the
Court went beyond its narrow holding and stated that "ERISA makes
clear that even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may
encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern."4 Although the
Court reasoned that laws indirectly affecting ERISA-governed plans
triggered Section 514(a), it offered no substantive definition of that
section's "relates to" language.
Two years later, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.," the Court
offered its first substantive definition of the "relates to" language of
ERISA Section 514(a). In Shaw, the Court held that New York's
Human Rights Law, which forbade discrimination in employee benefit
plans on the basis of pregnancy, was preempted by ERISA to the
extent that it prohibited practices otherwise lawful under federal law."°
In reaching its decision, the Court stated, "[a] law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan." 51
43. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
44. See ERISA §§ 514(b)(2)(A) & (b)(4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A) & (b)(4).
45. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
46. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 507-08.
47. Id. at 524-25.
48. Id. at 525.
49. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
50. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100-03.
51. Id. at 96-97.
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The Shaw "connection with or reference to" definition of "relates
to" became the Court's standard in subsequent cases. For example,
the Court employed both the Shaw definition, along with the "indirect
effect" language of Alessi, in reaching its decision in District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade. 2 In that case, the
court held that ERISA preempted the District of Columbia Worker's
Compensation Equity Amendment Act, which required employers to
provide health insurance for both their working employees and their
injured employees.5 3
Applying the "connection with or reference to" definition, the
Court consistently found that state laws indirectly affecting ERISA
governed plans fell within the broad swath cut by Section 514(a). 4
However, the Court's decision in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company"5 indicated
a shift in its ERISA jurisprudence. In Travelers, the Court addressed
a New York statute that imposed surcharges on hospital rates for
patients who purchased their health coverage through commercial
insurers or HMOs while imposing no similar surcharge on patients
who purchased their health coverage through a Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plan. 6 The plaintiffs, a group of fiduciaries and health benefit
providers for ERISA-governed plans, challenged the surcharges,
arguing that ERISA preempted the New York statute.57 The Court
held that the surcharges did not "relate to" employee benefit plans
under Section 514(a) and, thus, survived preemption.5"
The Court began its analysis in Travelers by stating its guiding
premise: "we have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated
state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of preemption with
the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law. . . . 'unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."' 59 In the case of ERISA Section 514(a) preemption, the
Court stated that Congress acted with the basic purpose of "avoid[ing]
a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform
52. 506 U.S. 125, 131 (1992).
53. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130-31.
54. In addition to Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133 (1990), and Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Services, Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988).
55. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
56. Id. at 650.
57. Id. at 651-52.
58. Id. at 649.
59. Id. at 654-55 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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administration of employee benefit plans."6  While admitting that
the surcharges made Blue Cross and Blue Shield more attractive
insurance alternatives, the Court reasoned that such an indirect
economic effect on the choice of insurance purchases did not trigger
ERISA Section 514(a) preemption. According to the Court, such
regulation does not trigger Section 51 4 (a) because it does not preclude
uniform administration of benefit plans: although the regulation may
affect the ultimate choice of health insurance carrier, it does not bind
a plan administrator to any particular choice.6'
While the Court held in Travelers that an indirect economic effect
such as that caused by the New York statute did not trigger ERISA
Section 514(a) preemption, it explicitly refused to hold that ERISA
preempts only direct regulation of employee benefit plans.62 Instead,
the Court recognized that
a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic
effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt
a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its
choice of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be pre-
empted under § 514.63
However, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to eliminate
regulation that indirectly affected ERISA-governed plans, because such
indirect regulation is "a result no different from myriad state laws in
areas traditionally subject to local regulation."64
The Court drew on its Travelers rationale and construed Section
514(a) even more restrictively in the pair of ERISA preemption cases
decided in its 1997 term. In California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction,6' the plaintiffs challenged
California's prevailing wage law.66 The law required payment of
prevailing construction industry wages to employees in apprenticeship
programs that had not received state approval while allowing the
payment of lower apprenticeship wages to employees participating in
state-approved programs." The plaintiffs argued that the prevailing
wage law "'relate[d] to' ERISA-governed apprenticeship training
60. Id. at 657.
61. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60.
62. Id. at 668.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
66. Id. at 316.
67. Id. at 324.
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programs, thus triggering Section 514(a) preemption. 68 However, the
Court found that because California's law neither had a connection
with69 nor made reference to7" the apprenticeship programs, it did
not relate to such programs within the meaning of Section 514(a).71
In deciding Dillingham, the Court analogized to the New York
statute at issue in Travelers.72 The Court stated that, in cases such
as Travelers,
if ERISA were concerned with any state action-such as medical-
care quality standards or hospital workplace regulations-that
increased costs of providing certain benefits, and thereby potentially
affected the choices made by ERISA plans, we would scarcely see
the end of ERISA's pre-emptive reach, and the words "relate to"
would limit nothing.73
Under that rationale, the Court reasoned that California's prevailing
wage statute was indistinguishable from the statute in Travelers.74
First, the Court noted that, as in the case of state regulation of hospital
rates, states traditionally regulate apprenticeship standards and
wages.7S Second, the Court stated that the regulation of apprentice-
ship programs did not implicate the express areas of ERISA's concern:"'reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like."' 76
Finally, the Court stated that "[a] reading of Section 514(a) resulting
in the pre-emption of traditionally state-regulated substantive law in
those areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be 'unsettling.' ' 77
The Court continued to narrow the scope of ERISA Section
514(a) in similar fashion in its next ERISA preemption case. In
DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,78 the
trustees of a trust fund established to administer employee benefit
plans challenged a New York law imposing a tax on the gross receipts
of health care facilities.79 The trustee plaintiffs owned and operated
68. Id. at 325. ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as "any plan, ...
established or .. . maintained for the purpose of providing its participants ... [with]
apprenticeship or other training programs." ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
69. Id. at 334.
70. Id. at 328.
71. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334.
72. Id. at 328-29.
73. Id. at 329 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 663-64).
74. Id. at 330.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661).
77. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665).
78. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
79. Id. at 810.
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three medical centers that provided medical, dental, and other health
care services to the beneficiaries of the trust fund."0 As owners of the
medical centers, the trustees alleged that ERISA preempted the New
York law because it "related to" the fund under Section 514(a).
However, the Court rejected the trustees' challenge, holding that the
New York law did not relate to the fund within the meaning of Section
514(a).81
In reaching its conclusion, the DeBuono Court undertook an
analysis similar to that employed in Dillingham. First, the Court noted
that the New York law operated in a field traditionally occupied by the
states.8 2 Second, because the New York tax implicated none of
ERISA's traditional objectives, the Court reasoned that the tax
constituted a law of "general applicability that impose[s] some burdens
on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do[es] not'relate to' them" within ERISA's meaning. 3 Finally, and in line with
Dillingham, the Court declared that "[a]ny state tax, or other law, that
increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have
some effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply
cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted by
the federal statute. 84
Clearly, the Court's ERISA jurisprudence has changed over the
nearly twenty years since it first addressed Section 514(a) preemption.
The Court's early, expansive reading of Section 514(a), as reflected in
Alessi, Shaw, and Greater Washington Board of Trade, gave way to a
more restrictive reading once the Court realized that ERISA could
potentially preempt even the most traditional of state laws. After
realizing the nearly unlimited reach of ERISA preemption, the Court,
beginning with Travelers and continuing through Dillingham and
DeBuono, has consistently narrowed the scope of Section 514(a)
preemption."
After Dillingham and DeBuono, it appears that the Court may no
longer uphold ERISA preemption arguments except in those cases in
which state laws directly target an ERISA-governed plan. The Court's
80. Id.
81. Id. at 815.
82. Id. at 814.
83. Id. at 815.
84. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 816.
85. Perhaps one can attribute the Court's more restrictive reading of Section 514(a) to those
Justices, such as Rehnquist and O'Connor, who zealously attempt to preserve states' rights. To
those Justices, and to the average lawyer, ERISA likely appears to encroach unduly on state
sovereignty by preempting all manner of state laws.
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narrowing ERISA jurisprudence will greatly impact the ability of
MCOs to raise successful ERISA preemption defenses to vicarious
liability medical malpractice claims.
2. Preemption of Vicarious Liability Medical Malpractice Claims
Against Managed Care Organizations
a. Complete Preemption
While an MCO may attempt to raise both complete and conflict
preemption defenses to vicarious liability claims based solely on an
affiliated physician's negligence, a defense based on complete preemp-
tion consistently fails in federal courts.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
ERISA preemption of medical malpractice claims, federal circuit court
decisions make it clear why MCOs cannot raise a successful complete
preemption defense to claims of vicarious tort liability.8 6 For exam-
ple, in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, the consolidated plaintiffs brought
claims against U.S. Healthcare for the alleged negligence of its affiliated
hospitals and medical personnel.8 7 U.S. Healthcare removed the
plaintiffs' cases to federal district court under the complete preemption
doctrine 8 and both district courts denied the plaintiffs' motions for
remand. 9 After parsing the theories of both complete preemption
and conflict preemption,9" the Dukes court held that U.S. Healthcare
improperly removed the cases to federal court. 91
In reaching its decision, the Dukes court reasoned that U.S.
Healthcare could not raise a complete preemption defense to the
plaintiffs' claims because the claims did not fall within the scope of
ERISA's civil enforcement provision.92 Under this provision, a
plaintiffs claim must attempt "'to recover benefits due ... under the
terms of [the] plan, to enforce ... rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify ... rights to future benefits under the terms of the
86. See, e.g., Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Rice, 65
F.3d at 637; Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350.
87. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 351. One of the plaintiffs, Cecilia Dukes, sued two physicians who
cared for her deceased husband as well as U.S. Healthcare under an ostensible agency theory,
claiming that the HMO was responsible for the conduct of the physicians who allegedly failed to
diagnose her husband's emergent condition.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 353-55.
91. Id. at 356.
92. Id.
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plan."'93 The court stated that the plaintiffs' claims merely attacked"the quality of benefits [that the plaintiffs] received."94 The plaintiffs
neither claimed that the plans erroneously withheld benefits nor did
they "ask the state courts to enforce their rights under the terms of
their respective plans or to clarify their rights to future benefits."9"
The Dukes court also looked to Congress' purpose in enacting
ERISA and found
nothing in the legislative history suggesting that [the civil enforce-
ment provision] was intended as a part of a federal scheme to
control the quality of the benefits received by plan participants.
Quality control of benefits, such as the health care benefits provided
here, is a field traditionally occupied by state regulation and we
interpret the silence of Congress as reflecting an intent that it
remain such. 6
Having characterized the plaintiffs' claims thus, the court held that the
complete preemption doctrine did not apply and that the district courts
should remand the cases to state court.97 Although the court held
that U.S. Healthcare could not raise a complete preemption defense to
the plaintiffs' claims, it left open the possibility that it could success-
fully defend against the claims in state court under Section 514(a)
conflict preemption.9"
At least two federal circuit courts followed essentially the same
rationale as Dukes in holding that ERISA does not completely preempt
vicarious liability claims against MCOs. In Pacificare of Oklahoma,
Inc. v. Burrage, the Tenth Circuit held that ERISA did not completely
preempt the plaintiffs vicarious liability medical malpractice and loss
of consortium claims against Pacificare 9 Pacificare removed the case
to federal district court, arguing that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs
claims.' 0 However, the district court remanded the plaintiffs claims
back to state court.1 ' On review, the Tenth Circuit held, as did the
93. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356 (quoting ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(alterations in original)).
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 357.
97. Id. at 356.
98. Id. at 361.
99. Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 153. The Dukes court issued its opinion less than a month earlier.
Thus, the Pacificare court incorrectly stated that the issue before it was one of first impression,
as "[n]o circuit has decided whether ERISA preempts a claim that an HMO is vicariously liable
for alleged malpractice of one of its physicians. Id.
100. Id. at 152.
101. Id.
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Dukes court, that the plaintiffs medical malpractice and loss of
consortium" 2 claims involved neither the administration nor the level
or quality of benefits received under the plaintiffs ERISA-governed
benefit plan.1"3 Therefore, because neither claim triggered ERISA's
civil enforcement provision, both survived complete preemption.14
The Seventh Circuit, while following the Dukes rationale,
proposed an additional inquiry to help courts determine whether
ERISA completely preempts vicarious liability claims against MCOs.
In Rice v. Panchal, the plaintiff sued both his physician and his health
plan administrator, Prudential Insurance, for medical malpractice.0
The plaintiff based his claim against Prudential on the state law theory
of respondeat superior.10 6 The Seventh Circuit held that ERISA did
not completely preempt the plaintiffs vicarious liability medical
malpractice claim against Prudential." 7 The court based its decision
on two factors. First, the plaintiffs claim did not trigger ERISA's civil
enforcement provision because it involved neither the administration
nor the level or quality of benefits received under the plaintiffs
Prudential plan.' Second, and as a corollary to the first, the court
noted that it need not refer to the terms of the Prudential plan to
resolve the plaintiffs claims." 9  Thus, the court reasoned that an
action brought by an ERISA plan participant constitutes "an action to'enforce his rights under the terms of a plan' . . . where the claim rests
upon the terms of the plan or the 'resolution of the [plaintiffs] state
law claim ... require[s] construing [the ERISA plan].""'" If a court
can resolve the claim without looking to the terms of the plan, then
neither ERISA's civil enforcement provisions nor the doctrine of
complete preemption apply."'
102. The court held that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs loss of consortium claim to the
extent that the plaintiff based her claim on Pacificare's alleged negligent or fraudulent
administration of her benefit plan. However, the court held that ERISA did not preempt the
plaintiffs loss of consortium claim to the extent that the plaintiff based it on Pacificare's vicarious
liability for medical malpractice. Id. at 155.
103. Id. at 155.
104. Id.
105. Rice, 65 F.3d at 638-39.
106. Id. at 639.
107. Id. at 646.
108. Id. at 642.
109. Id. at 645.
110. Id. at 644-45 (quoting ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (alterations in
original)).
111. Rice, 65 F.3d at 646.
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Two other circuit courts have addressed the issues presented in
the Dukes/Pacificare/Rice line of cases.1 2  While the courts found
that ERISA completely preempted the plaintiff's claims, both courts
recognized and based their holdings on the underlying premise that a
plaintiff's claim must fall within ERISA's civil enforcement section
before the complete preemption doctrine applies. In the cases before
each court, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant health plans
improperly denied them benefits due under their health care plan."'
Because the plaintiffs claimed that the plans improperly denied benefits
due under the plan, the claims triggered ERISA's civil enforcement
provision and the doctrine of complete preemption."4 Therefore,
ERISA completely preempted the claims.
Under the Dukes/ Pacificare/Rice line of cases, a defendant MCO
cannot invoke the doctrine of complete preemption and, thus, remove
a plaintiff's vicarious liability medical malpractice claim from state to
federal court. However, while an MCO cannot invoke the complete
preemption doctrine, it may still invoke the doctrine of conflict
preemption in state court as a defense to a plaintiff's vicarious liability
medical malpractice claim.
b. Conflict Preemption
While federal circuit courts consistently reject complete preemp-
tion ERISA defenses raised by MCOs to vicarious liability medical
malpractice claims, no circuit court has addressed an MCO's ERISA
conflict preemption defense."' The resulting absence of authority
leaves the federal district courts to their own devices when addressing
ERISA conflict preemption defenses. As a result, the district court
decisions run the spectrum of possible ERISA preemption hold-
ings." 6 Because the district court decisions vary so widely, this
Comment will briefly discuss two illustrative cases at opposite ends of
the ERISA preemption spectrum.
Naturally, the district courts holding that ERISA conflict
preemption precludes vicarious liability medical malpractice claims rely
112. See Jass, 88 F.3d 1482; see also Tolton v. American Biodyne, 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir.
1995).
113. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1489, 1493; Tolton, 48 F.3d at 941.
114. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1490; Tolton, 48 F.3d at 941.
115. This seems so exactly because the circuit courts refuse to acknowledge complete
preemption of straightforward medical malpractice claims, thus remanding the majority of such
claims, and the defendant MCOs' conflict preemption defenses, back to state court.
116. See, e.g., Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 153 n.2 (listing numerous federal district courts holding
that ERISA preempts medical malpractice claims against MCOs based on vicarious liability as
well as those holding that ERISA does not preempt such claims.)
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on the "relates to" language of Section 514(a). For example, in Altieri
v. Cigna Dental Health,"7 the court held that Section 514(a) pre-
empted the plaintiffs vicarious liability medical malpractice claim
against the defendant health plan."'8 In reaching its decision, the
court looked to Section 514(a)'s "relates to" language and reasoned
that, "(i1n determining whether a state law relates to an employee
benefit plan, courts are to apply 'common sense.""' 9  Applying its
common sense, the court first stated that "any indirect but substantial
effect on an employee benefit plan may be sufficient to trigger
preemption."' 2°  Second, the court noted that other federal courts
regularly find state common and statutory law claims related to
ERISA-governed benefit plans under Section 514(a). 1 Therefore,
according to the court, ERISA preempted the plaintiffs vicarious
liability medical malpractice claim against the defendant health
plan. 122
As required by ERISA, those district courts holding that conflict
preemption does not preclude vicarious liability medical malpractice
claims also rely on the "relates to" language of Section 514(a). For
instance, the court in Haas v. Group Health Plan 23 held that ERISA
did not preempt the plaintiffs vicarious liability medical malpractice
claim against the defendant HMO because the claim did not "relate to"
the plaintiffs benefit plan under Section 5 14(a).1 24  The court began
by noting that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly indicated that the'relates to' clause should be interpreted extremely broadly"' 12' and
that Section 514(a) may allow preemption of state law claims indirectly
affecting benefit plans.1 6  However, the court stated that "[wihile
ERISA's preemption provision is broad, the word 'related' must not be
taken literally.' 211 7  Thus, a claim's indirect effect on the administra-
117. 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990).
118. Id. at 65. Although the court dismissed the claim against the defendant health plan,
it remanded the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the defendant dentist to state court
for further proceedings. Id.
119. Id. at 63-64 (quoting Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)).
120. Id. at 64 (citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985)).
121. Id. at 64. Notably, however, none of the five cases cited by the court preempted
vicarious liability medical malpractice claims against health plans and/or MCOs.
122. Id. at 64.
123. 875 F. Supp 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994).
124. Id. at 549.
125. Id. at 547 (citing Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 45-56).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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tive procedures of a plan would not trigger ERISA preemption. 121
Rather, the claim must affect the primary administrative functions of
,a plan (such as eligibility determination and benefit calculation) to
trigger ERISA preemption.129  Because a vicarious liability medical
malpractice claim involves neither a determination of eligibility nor a
calculation of benefits, the court concluded that medical malpractice
claims in no way involve plan administration. 3 ' Instead, such claims
affect plans "'in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant
a finding that the law "relates to" the plan."""' Therefore, the court
held that the plaintiff s medical malpractice claim did not sufficiently
relate to her benefit plan to trigger ERISA preemption. 13 2
The Altieri and Haas decisions illustrate the different approaches
that District Courts take when addressing the issue of ERISA conflict
preemption of vicarious liability medical malpractice claims. Given the
lack of clear federal appellate authority, the District Courts must turn
to the Supreme Court's body of ERISA preemption decisions to resolve
that issue. After the Court's decisions in Dillingham and DeBuono, the
task of the District Courts should become easier.
III. ANALYSIS
Despite the intimidating tone of Consolidated's counsel in the
hypothetical that opened this Comment, Joe Peterson's attorney should
not necessarily fear Consolidated's threat of ERISA preemption.'33
After researching the issue of ERISA preemption thoroughly, Mr.
Peterson's attorney would likely conclude that neither the doctrine of
complete ERISA preemption nor ERISA conflict preemption apply to
Mr. Peterson's vicarious liability medical malpractice claim. Mr.
Peterson's attorney would probably be correct.
128. Id. at 548.
129. Haas, 875 F. Supp. at 548.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
132. Id. at 549. The court did not address the issue of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
as it retained diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at 546.
Thus, the court did not remand the plaintiff's claim to state court and decided the claim itself.
Although the court did not address subject matter jurisdiction and the complete preemption
doctrine, its finding that the plaintiff's claim did not involve administration of plan benefits would
preclude its application in this case.
133. As this Comment addresses only ERISA preemption, it makes no prediction as to
whether Mr. Peterson would successfully argue that his surgeon acted as an apparent agent for
Consolidated.
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A. Complete Preemption of Vicarious Liability
Medical Malpractice Claims
Under the Dukes/ Pacificare/Rice line of cases, Mr. Peterson may
rebut Consolidated's complete ERISA preemption defense with little
problem. First, under the Dukes test, Mr. Peterson's claim does not
trigger ERISA's civil enforcement provision. The Dukes court made
it clear that to trigger ERISA's civil enforcement provision and the
doctrine of complete preemption, a plaintiffs claim must attempt "'to
recover benefits due ... under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce...
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify . . .rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan."' 134 However, as in Dukes, Mr.
Peterson's vicarious liability medical malpractice claim involves neither
the administration nor the level of benefits received under the health
care plan administered by Consolidated. Rather, Mr. Peterson's claim
merely attacks the quality of the benefits provided by Consolidated.
Because Mr. Peterson's claim involves neither the administration nor
the level of benefits received under the Consolidated plan, ERISA's
civil enforcement provision does not apply. Therefore, Mr. Peterson's
claim does not trigger the doctrine of complete preemption.
Moreover, under the additional complete preemption inquiry
proposed by Rice, Mr. Peterson's claim fails to trigger ERISA's civil
enforcement provision. Under the Rice inquiry, if a court can resolve
a plaintiff s claim without looking to the terms of the ERISA-governed
health care plan, then neither ERISA's civil enforcement provision nor
the doctrine of complete preemption apply.135 As did the plaintiffs
claim in Rice, Mr. Peterson's claim against Consolidated rests on an
allegation of vicarious liability medical malpractice. As a state law tort
claim, Mr. Peterson's claim does not require the court to construe the
terms of Consolidated's health care plan. Because the court need not
refer to the terms of the Consolidated health care plan, Mr. Peterson's
claim does not trigger ERISA's civil enforcement provision. Therefore,
the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply.
Because Mr. Peterson can successfully rebut Consolidated's
complete ERISA preemption defense, a federal district court would
likely grant his motion for remand if Consolidated petitions for
removal to federal court. Assuming that the district court remanded
134. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356 (quoting ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § i132(a)(1)(B)
(alterations in the original)).
135. Rice, 65 F.3d at 646.
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Mr. Peterson's claim, Mr. Peterson would then turn his energies to
rebutting Consolidated's conflict preemption defense in state court.
B. Conflict Preemption of Vicarious Liability Medical
Malpractice Claims
No clear line of federal authority exists regarding conflict
preemption of vicarious liability medical malpractice claims. However,
the Supreme Court's rationale in the Travelers/Dillingham/DeBuono
line of cases, combined with the analysis of district courts such as that
in Haas, indicate that MCOs such as Consolidated may no longer rely
on Section 514(a) as an absolute defense to vicarious liability medical
malpractice claims.
First, much like the state laws in Travelers, Dillingham, and
DeBuono, Mr. Peterson's vicarious liability medical malpractice claim
operates in a field traditionally occupied by the states. Federal courts,
as all law students learn early in their careers, do not traditionally
address common law tort claims. Rather, state courts traditionally
resolve issues involving common law torts, such as medical malpractice
claims. Admittedly, Travelers, Dillingham, and DeBuono all involved
state statutory law rather than state common law. However, the
distinction between state common law and state statutory law in this
context is illusory. First, ERISA treats state common law and state
statutory law as equal candidates for preemption.'36 Moreover, in
certain aspects, common law tort claims are highly analogous to
statutory law. Tort law centers in large part on injury compensation.
However, like statutory law, tort law also functions in part to shape
behavior. Perhaps to an even greater extent than statutory law,
medical malpractice claims shape the behavior of healthcare provider
defendants through the threat of potential liability. Therefore, just as
state agencies directly regulate the behavior of MCOs and their
affiliated physicians through administrative action, 137 state courts
indirectly regulate the behavior of MCOs and their affiliated physicians
through tort actions, such as medical malpractice claims. Ultimately,
as the Court stated in Dillingham, "[a] reading of Section 514(a)
resulting in the pre-emption of traditionally state-regulated substantive
law in those areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be 'unset-
tling.'" 138
136. See ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (defining state laws as "all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law" (emphasis added)).
137. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
138. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330.
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Second, state vicarious liability medical malpractice claims such as
Mr. Peterson's do not implicate the express areas of ERISA's concern:
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility'39 or failure or
refusal to provide benefits.14° Rather, as the Third Circuit pointed
out in Dukes, medical malpractice claims brought by plaintiffs such as
Mr. Peterson attempt to hold an MCO liable for the negligent
treatment provided by its affiliated physicians. As such, medical
malpractice claims attack the quality of benefits that the MCO
provided, not the MCO's failure or refusal to provide benefits.
Because Mr. Peterson's claim attacks the quality of benefits provided
by Consolidated rather than reporting, disclosure, or fiduciary
breaches, or Consolidated's failure or refusal to provide benefits, it
does not implicate the express areas of ERISA's concern and, therefore,
does not trigger ERISA conflict preemption.
Third, much like the statutes in Travelers, Dillingham, and
DeBuono, the indirect economic effect of vicarious liability medical
malpractice claims does not trigger ERISA conflict preemption.
Undoubtedly, medical malpractice claims such as Mr. Peterson's
impose some indirect economic burden on the administration of
ERISA-governed healthcare plans. Every judgment obtained by a
plaintiff against an MCO increases the cost of doing business and,
thus, indirectly increases the cost of providing benefits to covered
participants. However, as the Court reasoned in DeBuono, ERISA does
not automatically preempt any state law that increases the cost of
providing benefits to participants.14' Instead, the claim must pre-
clude the plan's uniform administration of benefits 142 by impacting
such functions as eligibility determination and benefit calculation,
before it triggers ERISA conflict preemption.' Mr. Peterson's
vicarious liability medical malpractice claim, as stated earlier, attacks
the quality of benefits provided by Consolidated, not Consolidated's
eligibility determination or benefit calculation. Because Mr. Peterson's
claim involves neither of these issues, it in no way precludes the
uniform administration of Consolidated's plan benefits. Therefore,
because the indirect economic effects of Mr. Peterson's vicarious
liability medical malpractice claim do not impact plan administration,
it is not preempted by ERISA.
139. See id.
140. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356.
141. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 816.
142. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60.
143. See Haas, 875 F. Supp. at 548.
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Mr. Peterson's vicarious liability medical malpractice claim can
survive Consolidated's ERISA complete preemption defense. First,
Mr. Peterson's claim operates in a field traditionally occupied by the
states. Second, Mr. Peterson's claim does not implicate the express
areas of ERISA's concern. Finally, the indirect economic effect of Mr.
Peterson's claim does not trigger ERISA conflict preemption.
Therefore, Mr. Peterson's attorney should have the state court trial
that he counted on.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past, MCOs such as Consolidated could feel relatively
confident in relying on ERISA as a defense to vicarious liability
medical malpractice claims. Even where district courts refused removal
under the doctrine of complete preemption and remanded their cases
for trial in state courts, defendant MCOs could still raise and possibly
prevail on an ERISA conflict preemption defense.
However, the Supreme Court narrowed its ERISA jurisprudence
substantially when it decided Dillingham and DeBuono in its 1997 term.
In those cases, the Court indicated its refusal to allow ERISA to
preempt laws operating in fields traditionally occupied by the states.
Because vicarious liability medical malpractice claims are traditionally
issues resolved by state law, Dillingham and DeBuono likely sounded
the death knell for ERISA preemption defenses to vicarious liability
medical malpractice claims. Instead of relying on ERISA preemption
as a defense, MCOs after Dillingham and DeBuono will likely have to
defend the old fashioned way: by showing that their affiliated
physicians met the standard of care.
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